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Schapelle Corby

The Role Of
The Integrity Commissioner
And The
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
(ACLEI)

An Independent Report

The Expendable Project
www.expendable.tv

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. The ACLEI Assessment

2.1 Part A – Initial Assessment

2.1.1 Enquiries

2.1.2 Comments

2.2 Part B – Director Intelligence

2.2.1 The PROMIS System

2.2.1.1 The Forensic Testing Of The Marijuana

2.2.1.2 The Baggage Handler Interviews

2.2.1.3 The Provision Of Testing Assistance

2.2.1.4 The Strict Limitation Of Investigation

2.2.1.5 The Missing CCTV Footage

2.2.2 Assessment Report Conclusions

2.2.2.1 The Source Of The Marijuana

2.2.2.2 The Baggage Handler Interviews

2.2.2.3 The Strict Limitation Of Investigation

2.2.2.4 The Ray Cooper Allegations

2.2.2.5 The Missing CCTV Footage

2.2.2.6 The Forensic Testing Of The Marijuana

3. The Acting Integrity Commissioner

3.1 The Acting Commissioner's Role

3.2 The Acting Commissioner's Conclusions

4. Report Conclusions

Appendix

1. INTRODUCTION

The *Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity*, ACLEI, is a government agency which claims to provide “*independent assurance to government about the integrity of prescribed law enforcement agencies and their staff members*”.

Specifically, it states that “*The Integrity Commissioner, supported by the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), is responsible for preventing, detecting and investigating serious and systemic corruption issues in the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Federal Police.*”



In a nutshell, ACLEI polices the police, for the government of Australia.

It is therefore reasonable to expect that such an organization will conduct itself with the utmost integrity and professionalism, and that its investigations will be performed to the highest and most rigorous of standards.

Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that it will ensure that its independence always remains beyond question.


SCHAPELLE CORBY

This report documents how ACLEI actually handled the most serious of complaints and allegations regarding AFP Corruption, with respect to the Schapelle Corby case.

2. THE ACLEI ASSESSMENT

In 2010, a prominent Schapelle Corby supporter, Mrs Kim Bax, lodged a formal complaint with ACLEI regarding a subset of the many examples of failure of duty, misconduct, and corruption, which are presented by *The Expendable Project*.

The subsequent ACLEI *assessment* was documented in a file, which was assigned the identifier CIN 000188:

 Australian Government Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity	Security/Caveat: IN-CONFIDENCE	
	ACLEI Operations Branch	10/74
CIN 000188		
FOLIOS 001-157		
Previous Part:	File Assigned To: since 27/05/2010 at 3:48 pm	Creation Date: 27/05/2010 at 3:48 pm

Archival Action:

-IN-CONFIDENCE

CIN 188
10/74

This is organized into *parts*, which are described in the subsequent sub-sections.

2.1. PART A – INITIAL ASSESSMENT

The first part is a high level overview, or *initial assessment*. It provides the following synopsis:

On 21 May 2010, Mrs Kim Bax made a referral to ACLEI via the Hotline. Mrs Bax is a supporter of Miss Schapelle Corby and her family. (Miss Corby is the Australian woman in prison in Indonesia having been convicted of importing cannabis into the country. Notwithstanding that cannabis was found in one of her bags, Miss Corby denies any knowledge of it.) Miss Corby's case is a high profile one and is the subject of ongoing media attention.

To summarise this referral, Mrs Bax has alleged corruption by the AFP on the grounds that:

- (i) they did not investigate adequately any offences Miss Corby may have committed in Australia;
- (ii) they corruptly allowed airport CCTV evidence to be destroyed;
- (iii) they failed to investigate adequately the possibility that the drugs were inadvertently left in Miss Corby's bag by corrupt baggage handlers involved in a drug-smuggling ring within Australia; and
- (iv) corrupt airport-based AFP staff were engaged in criminality with corrupt baggage handlers and that the AFP did not investigate properly to avoid their own corrupt staff being exposed.

Mrs Bax claims that had the AFP investigated properly then they would have uncovered evidence which would help prove Miss Corby's innocence. One of the things that Mrs Bax does frequently is refer to a 'core' list of 29 questions, which she believes should be answered. Many of those questions should be posed to the Indonesian authorities.

It should be noted that this summary is, in fact, subjective. Mrs Bax's documented complaints were wider in scope than is suggested here, and were supported by a considerable amount of material.

2.1.1 ENQUIRIES

This initial assessment stated that the following enquiries were made:

A number of enquiries have been conducted by ACLEI: AFP records that we have access to have been examined, other information has been provided by the AFP and other enquiries made.

The second paragraph of this particular segment was obliterated with black ink, to prevent public disclosure.

2.1.2 COMMENTS

The final comments in Part A were as follows:

Assessing officer's comments
<p>On the face of it, this referral raises a <i>prima facie</i> corruption issue within the meaning of the LEIC Act. However, I am also mindful that even if the AFP did not investigate adequately any Australian offences in relation to the drugs found in Miss Corby's bag, that does not necessarily mean that there was a corrupt motive. This would, of course, take the matter out of the Integrity Commissioner's jurisdiction.</p> <p>Mrs Bax is a highly motivated individual; she is very passionate about Miss Corby's case and is insistent on her innocence. She has made frequent allegations of ACLEI 'stonewalling' with our assessment, when being critical of the time that it has taken to complete it. Anything less than a full investigation by ACLEI is likely not to be accepted by her and is likely to result in numerous website entries critical of the decision.</p>

Here, ACLEI set the tone for the main assessment, by starkly claiming that if the perceived *motive* of any AFP corruption was not corrupt, it bears no responsibility for the matter.

The implication of this, for example, is that if the motive was political, then any act of corruption is deemed to be out of its jurisdiction.

Given that *The Expendable Project* demonstrates the clear political agenda of the AFP, this is a central and critical statement.

2.2 PART B – DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE

The second part is the main assessment form, and is headed *Director Intelligence*.

The first page of this replays the summary from *Part 1*, but includes a number of remarks which appear to seek to undermine Mrs Bax. For example:

It is clear from her blog entries that Ms Bax was in contact with a number of Australian agencies prior to her contact with ACLEI. It appears clear in Ms Bax's mind that agencies which fail to respond to Ms Bax's questions in a manner which pleased her, must either be corrupt themselves, or at least engaged in a conspiracy with other agencies to conceal the corruption which must have existed in order for Ms Corby to have been convicted.

Ms Bax appears to have formed this view based on an article published in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on 8 May 2005.

Regarding the latter, *The Hidden World Research Group* subsequently interviewed Mrs Bax, who confirmed that this wasn't the case at all, and that she referenced the article in her blog simply because she was able to provide a direct web link to it.

The same attitude is illustrated by the liberal use of inverted commas and italics when referring to her correspondence and blog posts.

on 29 March 2010, which details her 'crime report' to the AFP Commissioner. The 29 March 2010 blog details her endeavours to report the *export of around \$40,000 worth of marijuana from this country, to Bali, on Friday October 8th 2004*. Clearly Ms Bax is referring to the Cannabis found in Ms Corby's possession on her arrival at Bali that same day. In this 'crime report', Ms Bax also raises her concerns that the AFP's actions in 'failing' to pursue forensic examination of the Cannabis located in Ms Corby's possession in Bali, including the weighing of the package and the fingerprinting and DNA testing of the packaging, *would have strongly*

Note that this is an altogether different approach to that adopted throughout, with respect to AFP officers.

2.2.1 THE PROMIS SYSTEM

On page three, the assessor moves on to a meeting with a member of *AFP Professional Standards*, in which they jointly examined the '*Police Real-Time On-Line Management and Investigation System*' (PROMIS), which is an information database.

However, the information retrieved and reproduced in the report, to support the subsequent conclusions, can be shown to be false, highly questionable, or directly disputed by third parties:

2.2.1.1 The Forensic Testing Of The Marijuana

The AFP also advised the Minister that the AFP did not have the capability to identify the origin of the Cannabis alleged to have been found in Ms Corby's possession.

The *Hidden World Research Group* has obtained correspondence from a leading forensics expert, who offered to perform these precise tests at the time. The AFP did not pursue this, and refused to facilitate the testing of the marijuana placed in Schapelle Corby's bag, when approached. Note also that such tests were well established at that time.

2.2.1.2 The Baggage Handler Interviews


It was reported within the AFP on 12 August 2005 that the AFP and personnel attached to the Queensland Police Service (QPS) State Drug Investigation Squad had completed interviews with all the baggage handlers who had been on duty at the Brisbane domestic terminal at the time that Ms Corby had departed Brisbane. It was reported that no admissions had been made, nor any evidence uncovered of any baggage handler placing anything in Ms Corby's luggage.

Citing '*no admissions had been made*', as supporting evidence to dismiss serious allegations, is clearly extremely questionable in itself. However, in July 2011, *The Hidden World Research Group* identified and directly interviewed a Brisbane baggage handler, who categorically denied that all the baggage handlers had been interviewed.

2.2.1.3 The Provision Of Testing Assistance

On 21 December 2004, the AFP Senior Liaison Officer in Bali advised that the Indonesian Police did not require any assistance from the AFP.

This, and other entries to the same effect, directly contradict statements made by the Bali police themselves, both to Schapelle Corby's lawyers, and directly to the Australian media:



2.2.1.4 The Strict Limitation Of Investigation

By early 2005, Qantas identified 180 baggage handlers who were working in the Brisbane domestic, Sydney domestic and Sydney international terminals at the time that Ms Corby travelled through those airports. An operational decision was taken to interview all Brisbane-based handlers and, due to the volume of handlers, to not interview the Sydney-based handlers.

This starkly suggests that a subjective judgement was taken on the value of Schapelle Corby's life, versus cost. Equally, however, it could be suggested that this option was considered to be less damaging than the potential disclosure of AFP and other corruption, which was undoubtedly present at Sydney airport.

Regardless, ACLEI immediately chose to support this central, and extremely disturbing, decision:

Comment: It would seem that, as the allegation by Ms Corby's defence team was that corrupt baggage handlers had inserted the Cannabis which became subject of the importation charge against Ms Corby into Ms Corby's luggage at the Brisbane domestic terminal (with a view to it being extracted by other handlers on the bag's arrival in Sydney), the decision to limit interviews to the baggage handlers in Brisbane was not an unreasonable one.

This proposition is, in fact, entirely false. Schapelle Corby's defence team did not exclude other possible insertion points at all. Her lawyers presented Brisbane as just one possibility, and even this scenario embraced serious criminality, and the transfer of the marijuana, specifically at Sydney airport.

The criticality of an investigation at Sydney was re-enforced by the allegations of former AFP Internal Investigator, Ray Cooper, who actually stated that AFP officers were involved in the drug trafficking there. The assessor was well aware of these, as he actually referred to them earlier in the report:

Since Mr Cooper's comments were published, The Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler DL conducted a review of airport security and policing at the request of the Australian Government.

Equally, both the AFP and ACELI were well aware of the '*Mocha*' Operation, and the transfer of South American drugs through Sydney airport at exactly the same time as Schapelle Corby passed through. Again, ACLEI had referred directly to this, just two pages earlier in the report:

was 'running a major drugs operation' in the same Sydney Airport terminal which Ms Corby transited through, at the same time that Ms Corby was transiting.

It could be speculated that these earlier stark references were overlooked, in the haste to excuse the serious AFP failure just identified.

The crucial need for a full investigation at the two Sydney airports (domestic and international), and the consequential interviewing of the baggage handlers based there, could hardly have been clearer.

Yet the author simply dismissed the idea with the flimsiest of rationale.

2.2.1.5 The Missing CCTV Footage

AFP was advised that there had been a history of faults with these cameras, with numerous maintenance calls being lodged. The AFP was advised that maintenance of the CCTV system conducted on 19 October 2004 resulted in all vision, including that for 8 October 2004, the day Ms Corby travelled, being wiped.

This version of events, that the CCTV footage was deleted accidentally during maintenance, is entirely different to the version which the AFP themselves gave to Parliament, and stated in a ministerial brief:

4. The investigation also examined baggage handling procedures, security of baggage and airside access to other employees and contractors. Qantas advised the closed circuit television (CCTV) recording of the check-in area and air side for 8 October 2004 had been recorded over, and stated it is normal practice to recycle the CCTV tape every seven to ten days.

- Qantas advise the closed circuit television (CCTV) recording of the check-in area and air side for 8 October 2004 had been recorded over, and stated it is normal practice to recycle the CCTV tape every seven to ten days.

Again, ACLEI failed to identify this direct contradiction, or to refer to it in any way.

The serious issues documented with respect to these matters, were identified, following a preliminary investigation by *The Hidden World Research Group*. The information obtained, yet completely omitted or ignored by ACLEI, is largely available in the public domain. All of it undermines the position of the AFP, and supports the proposition of serious and systemic corruption.

It is thus clear that, instead of performing the due diligence one might expect of a body charged with serious obligation by a nation state, ACLEI simply accepted the version presented by the AFP as fact. No contrary question was even contemplated.

Even from the outset, ACLEI appear to have been prompting the AFP to direct the script, as illustrated within the early correspondence between them (dated 2nd June 2010):

It would assist our assessment process greatly if we were able to get as comprehensive briefing as possible on the AFP's involvement in the Schapelle Corby matter. We feel that such a briefing would provide us with an understanding of the matter and allow us to provide informed advice to the Integrity Commissioner on what action, if any, he should take in respect of Ms Bax's information.

Your thoughts would be appreciated.

Equally, a host of other related questions were simply ignored. And, for example, the myriad of documentation and primary evidence presented within *The Expendable Project* was not even identified.

However, it is upon this limited, false, and entirely flawed perspective that the author proceeded to offer his conclusions.

2.2.2 ASSESSMENT REPORT CONCLUSIONS

Following this most shallow of exercises, the author again inaccurately summarizes Mrs Bax's complaints. He then purports to "*address*" them:

2.2.2.1 The Source Of The Marijuana

He dismisses the AFP's complete lack of interest in the source of 4.2kg of marijuana. He openly states that there is no "*onus*" upon them to investigate such matters. Even with the knowledge of so many other inconsistencies, and the unremitting public allegations, he insists that there can be no reasonable question of corruption:

Point 1. It would not be usual practice for the AFP to investigate the production (cultivation) or supply of Cannabis. Offences for such acts exist under State and Territory legislation, and are routinely administered by State and Territory law enforcement agencies. There was no onus on the AFP to investigate such offences and there can be no reasonable inference that any decision by the AFP not to investigate these offences was motivated by corruption on the part of any person.

2.2.2.2 The Baggage Handler Interviews

Even though directly disputed by at least one Brisbane baggage handler, he repeats the AFP claim to have interviewed all Brisbane baggage handlers, to dismiss any idea of reluctance to investigate:

exportation of drugs under the Customs Act 1901. This investigation was code-named Operation ISOGON, and involved the interview of all Brisbane-based baggage handlers on shift at the time that Ms Corby's luggage transited the Brisbane domestic terminal. The existence of this investigation and the results of it, are well documented in PROMIS. There is no evidence of reluctance on the part of the AFP to conduct this investigation.

2.2.2.3 The Strict Limitation Of Investigation

Almost grudgingly, he refers to the fundamental question of omitting the critical Sydney airports from investigation, only to deny, without offering a shred of supporting evidence, that this was motivated by corruption:

Whether the investigation should have included the interview of all Sydney-based baggage handlers, or at least the baggage handlers operating at the Sydney domestic terminal, may be a question for others to consider. I do not believe that it is reasonable to suggest that the decision to not interview Sydney-based handlers as part of this investigation was in any way motivated by corruption.

2.2.2.4 The Ray Cooper Allegations

Matters relating to the serious corruption allegations of former AFP officer, Ray Cooper, appear to be deemed too inappropriate for public sight, but he readily dismisses them as “*dangerous*”:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It would be dangerous to allege the existence of corruption solely on the basis of Mr Cooper's comments.

2.2.2.5 The Missing CCTV Footage

His endorsement of the AFP's failure to preserve any CCTV footage from three airport terminals is based entirely upon a misconception:

Whether CCTV vision from any of the three terminals would have shown anything of interest in relation to Ms Corby or her luggage will remain questionable. However, to suggest that either Qantas or the AFP had a duty to preserve any such vision, merely because a person who transited through those airports had been apprehended for an offence, is unreasonable. There can be no basis on which to suggest that the AFP acted in any way corruptly in relation to this matter.

Had ACLEI conducted even cursory research into this matter, it would have quickly discovered that repeated and increasingly desperate requests for CCTV footage had been made by Schapelle Corby's family, in the days immediately following her arrest. This was the real context of the AFP's failure to seize the potentially critical footage.

The directly contradictory stories, provided by the AFP for the loss of the footage, are another central, and overlooked, issue.

NOTE: Further information on the AFP's disturbing role, with respect to the CCTV systems, can be found in Section 3 of the report: *'Exceptions At Australian Airports With Respect To The Schapelle Corby Case'*

2.2.2.6 The Forensic Testing Of The Marijuana

He again uses false and flawed information in support of the AFP:

Point 4. Once again, unbeknownst to Ms Bax, the AFP did engage in efforts to facilitate the forensic examination of the Cannabis located in Ms Corby's luggage and the packaging in which it was contained. As reported earlier in this assessment, all offers by the AFP to the Indonesian Police to assist with forensic examinations were declined.

It is clear from the records sighted in PROMIS, that contrary to Ms Bax's claims, the AFP offered to assist the Indonesian Police with the forensic examination of the exhibits on a number of occasions, to no avail. Accordingly, to suggest that any member of the AFP acted in any way corruptly in this matter would be completely unjustified.

As already referenced, the AFP's claim that they lacked the capability to test the marijuana for its country of origin was false. The AFP's version of events, with respect to assistance with testing, was also directly contradicted by both Schapelle Corby's Indonesian lawyers and the Bali police.

A comprehensive investigation into this specific issue can be found within *The Mutual Evasion Report*, on the Expendable.TV website.

THE REPORT CONCLUSION

The most flimsy and superficial of investigations, based entirely upon information provided by the AFP themselves, which was false, flawed or disputed, resulted in the inevitable:

Conclusion and recommendation

While Ms Bax's allegations raise a corruption issue as defined by the LEIC Act, the inquiries conducted by ACLEI during the assessment of the information provided by Ms Bax have failed to identify any evidence of corrupt conduct in relation to this issue on the part of any member of the AFP. Furthermore, these inquiries have failed to show any instance where it would be reasonable to suggest that any member of the AFP has acted corruptly.

I recommend that the Integrity Commissioner take no further action in relation to this corruption issue (section 31(2)(b) of the LEIC Act) on the basis that an investigation of the corruption issue is not warranted having regard to all the circumstances (section 31(4)(e) of the LEIC Act).

The entire assessment comprised just five pages, and can be obtained in full from *The Hidden World Research Group*.

3. THE ACTING INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER

The assessment report was subsequently submitted to the *Acting Integrity Commissioner*, Robert Cornall, on 14th January 2011.

However, preliminary research into Mr Cornall himself suggests that he is regarded as a staunch supporter of the Howard government:



Indeed, as Phillip Ruddock's secretary at the *Attorney General's Department*, Cornall was, in fact, at the heart of the Howard regime when the Schapelle Corby case unfolded.

Given the position and actions of this regime, as documented by *The Expendable Project*, this in itself raises a number of extremely serious questions.

Effectively, Cornall had the final decision on whether to proceed with, or reject, the complaints being made. Yet he was part of the regime to which the complaints themselves fundamentally referred.

The Hidden World Research Group has not yet been able to establish the circumstances of Cornall's positioning as *Acting Integrity Commissioner*, with respect to this particular complaint.

3.1 THE ACTING COMMISSIONER'S ROLE

As *Acting Integrity Commissioner*, Cornall's responsibility was to satisfy himself that the assessment was objectively and rigorously conducted. It was his responsibility to sign off the report itself.

The serious flaws within the report, as documented in the previous section, are clear enough. Many are self evident, not only with respect to the individual conflicts with the real situation, but in terms of the superficial nature of the exercise, and its tenor when simply accepting the AFP's version of events.

It would not be unreasonable to expect that an experienced eye would immediately detect that significant and serious issues were evident.

3.2 THE ACTING COMMISSIONER'S CONCLUSIONS

In his one-sheet decision, Cornall commented as follows:

I have carefully considered the Corruption Issue Assessment Form report and recommendations dated 13 December 2010 prepared by the Director Intelligence.


I accept the Director's summary and categorisation of Ms Bax's concerns relating to the AFP. In essence, the Director assesses that Ms Bax alleges that the AFP failed to investigate the source of the cannabis found in Ms Corby's luggage in Bali; failed to investigate the possibility that baggage handlers placed the cannabis in the luggage; failed to preserve CCTV footage at three Australian airports; and failed to forensically examine the cannabis seized in Bali.

It should be noted that this, in fact, is not a direct representation of Mrs Bax's allegations, but rather, a subjective interpretation.

Cornall concluded that:

However, even if all of Ms Bax's assertions about the AFP's actions or failures to act were accurate, they do not by themselves amount to or disclose a corruption issue.

Accordingly I accept the recommendation that I take no further action pursuant to section 31(2)(b) of the LEIC Act on the basis that an investigation is not warranted having regarded all the circumstances (section 31(4)(e) of the LEIC Act).

Acting Integrity Commissioner signature	
Name	Robert Cornall
Date	14 January 2011

This extraordinary statement suggests that issues, such as the wilful destruction of primary evidence, do not amount to "*a corruption issue*".

Further, his claim of "*having regarded all the circumstances*" has been shown to be untrue, as the AFP did not furnish ACLEI with the true material facts, and ACLEI did not research them for themselves.

He endorsed the clearly flawed exercise on 14th January 2011. In his letter informing Mrs Bax of this decision, he took this even further, referring to the most limited and superficial of assessments as "*extensive*":

Despite these extensive enquiries over a period of months, no corroborative evidence or information about possible corrupt conduct has been found that would warrant further investigation by ACLEI.

4. REPORT CONCLUSIONS

Despite high profile and frequent allegations of AFP corruption, over a period of almost seven years, ACLEI failed to initiate even a cursory investigation of its own volition. Only when allegations of corruption were levelled at ACLEI itself, by members of the public, did it embark upon the exercise documented in this report.

By any measure, its assessment was flimsy, unprofessional, and seriously flawed. The exercise itself was skewed to produce an outcome favourable to the AFP. Specifically:

The written report, and background notes, obtained by *The Hidden World Research Group*, demonstrate a hostile, or at the very least, disrespectful, attitude toward the complainant.

The assessor did not interview Mrs Bax to establish the precise details of her complaint.

ACLEI openly and directly positioned itself, such that politically motivated AFP corruption was outside its own scope.

ACLEI failed to investigate the key issues directly for themselves. Instead, it accepted statements made by the AFP without question, and certainly without validation.

Key witnesses, and those who were party to the events of 2005, were not interviewed. There is no evidence to suggest that their research extended significantly beyond a liaison with AFP personnel, and a joint perusal of their limited database.

In many cases, even with only cursory research, the AFP's version of events can be proven to be entirely false.

The ACLEI assessor demonstrably overlooked significant contrary evidence when declaring his support for the AFP's inaction and position.

The haphazard and shallow approach adopted, suggests a lack of will to investigate the complaints seriously. This in itself suggests an unbalanced and partial position.

The final decision maker, the *Acting Integrity Commissioner*, was active in the Howard government when the events occurred, creating a clear conflict of interest.

At the very least, the decision maker did not exercise due diligence when signing off the assessment.

[Report Conclusions]

The evidence suggests either gross incompetence, or wilful misconduct on the part of a number of individuals.

From a wider perspective, it suggests an institutional or cultural bias which is wholly inconsistent with the defined functions of the organization.


Given the clear political context, serious questions also arise regarding the possibility of a pre-determined agenda with respect to this case. In layman's terms, our findings and conclusions are consistent with those of an alleged *cover-up*.

APPENDIX


Selected Documentation

[Appendix]

The decision form, as completed by the Acting Integrity Commissioner, Robert Cornall:

Corruption Issue Assessment Form – Integrity Commissioner	
Administration	
Corruption Issue Number:	188
Case number:	195
TRIM file number:	10/74
Integrity Commissioner comments / decision	
<p>I have carefully considered the Corruption Issue Assessment Form report and recommendations dated 13 December 2010 prepared by the Director Intelligence.</p> <p>I accept the Director's summary and categorisation of Ms Bax's concerns relating to the AFP. In essence, the Director assesses that Ms Bax alleges that the AFP failed to investigate the source of the cannabis found in Ms Corby's luggage in Bali; failed to investigate the possibility that baggage handlers placed the cannabis in the luggage; failed to preserve CCTV footage at three Australian airports; and failed to forensically examine the cannabis seized in Bali.</p> <p>Although Ms Bax is not aware of this information, the Assessment Form records the steps the AFP has taken in relation to a number of those matters. [REDACTED]</p> <p>However, even if all of Ms Bax's assertions about the AFP's actions or failures to act were accurate, they do not by themselves amount to or disclose a corruption issue.</p> <p>Accordingly I accept the recommendation that I take no further action pursuant to section 31(2)(b) of the LEIC Act on the basis that an investigation is not warranted having regarded all the circumstances (section 31(4)(e) of the LEIC Act).</p>	
Acting Integrity Commissioner signature	
Name	Robert Cornall
Date	14 January 2011

Cornall's letter to Mrs Bax, informing her of his decision:


Australian Government
Australian Commission for
Law Enforcement Integrity

Our reference: 10/74

25 January 2011

Ms Kim Bax
77 Orion Road
CEDAR VALE QLD 4285

Dear Ms Bax

Schapelle Corby and the Australian Federal Police

I refer to your correspondence with the Integrity Commissioner, Mr Phillip Moss, commencing with your email received on 20 May 2010. I am writing to you as Acting Integrity Commissioner because Mr Moss is presently on leave.

You have raised concerns about the actions of members of the Australian Federal Police following the arrest of Ms Schapelle Corby on 8 October 2004.

The Australian Law Enforcement Integrity Commission has assessed the information you provided and has carried out a number of enquiries. Those enquiries include examining confidential law enforcement records and obtaining related information.

Despite these extensive enquiries over a period of months, no corroborative evidence or information about possible corrupt conduct has been found that would warrant further investigation by ACLEI.


Accordingly, I have decided to take no further action in relation to the issues you have raised in accordance with the provisions of section 31(2) of the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006.

I note you have also raised two other matters with ACLEI. They are:

- Your concerns regarding the alleged payment of monies to a person referred to as 'Tom', and
- The actions of the AFP with respect to baggage handlers.

Those two matters remain under assessment. ACLEI will advise you of its decisions in relation to them in due course.

Yours sincerely



Robert Cornall AO
Acting Integrity Commissioner


ABN: 78796734093

GPO Box 305 Canberra City ACT 2601 Telephone: 6229 9300 Fax: 6230 7341 Web site: www.aclei.gov.au E-mail: contact@aclei.gov.au

[Appendix]


The following letter illustrates the cosy relationship between the AFP and ACLEI.

When Mark Walters was confronted by Mrs Bax, on whether his predecessor's allegations of AFP corruption in Sydney had been investigated, he told her that he was unable to give her that information, because it was subject to "*secrecy provisions*".




[Appendix]

The following is ACLEI's opening letter to the AFP. The final paragraph indicated the nature of the exercise which was to follow; one in which ACLEI would follow a script broadly dictated by the AFP themselves.



ACLEI demonstrates the spirit of the Freedom of Information Act.





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